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The Social System Identification Problem
Hoi-To Wai†, Anna Scaglione†, Amir Leshem‡
Abstract— The focus of this paper is modeling what we call
a Social Radar, i.e. a method to estimate the relative influence
between social agents, by sampling their opinions and as they
evolve, after injecting in the network stubborn agents. The
stubborn agents opinion is not influenced by the peers they seek
to sway, and their opinion bias is the known input to the social
network system. The novelty is in the model presented to probe
a social network and the solution of the associated regression
problem. The model allows to map the observed opinion onto
system equations that can be used to infer the social graph and
the amount of trust that characterizes the links.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the rapid growth of online social media such
as Facebook, Twitter has generated a lot of interests in
researches on social networks. Importantly, it has provided
a platform for researchers from multiple disciplines, rang-
ing from social science to statistical physics, to study and
understand the behavior of the human society. In the con-
trols area, due to the close ties with decentralized robots
coordination problems, several works focuses on modeling
the opinion dynamics/exchanges (see e.g. [1]–[8] and refer-
ences therein). Arguably, understanding the opinion dynam-
ics through which individuals seek to share information and
agree is one of the most important social studies. In light of
this, extensions to the basic opinion dynamics model are also
popular, e.g., [9]–[14]. Also, in the recent developments, the
notion of controllability and observability has been extended
to the context of complex networks [15]–[18].
The common definition of a social network focuses on the
social graph component [19], where we represent individuals
(social agents) as nodes and the friendships between them
as edges. Knowing the social graph alone is insufficient for
understanding social networks. In particular, individuals may
exhibit different degree of trust in their neighbors. There is
strong trust among the close friends and weaker trust between
individuals without mutual interests [20], [21]. Identifying
the social system allows us to predict the behavior of
individuals in a social network in times of decision making.
The difficulty is that, while the interaction between agents
may be evident, the trust between them and the impact an
interaction has on another agent is not directly observable.
The focus of this study is identifying what we call a social
system, which encompasses both the social graph and the
set of trusts between individuals. We define the state as
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the instantaneous opinions; and the output as the observed
opinions after a certain period of time of discussions. The
social system is modeled as an endogenous system of opinion
updates that follows exogenous stimuli that we observe.
We are interested in solving the social system identification
(SSI) problem, which could be viewed as the development
of a Social Radar since the idea is injecting test signals
into the system and observing its output [22], much like
in a traditional Radar. An inverse problem is then solved
by gathering observations that are tied to the input opinions
and output opinion pairs. The challenge is that the latter are
endogenous. In the literature, a related issue is the inference
problem of graphical models, e.g., [23]–[25]. The latter
assumes that the effect of the social system is manifested
in the correlation of the neighboring opinions, instead of
the opinion dynamics. Indeed, our model is similar to that
considered in [26]–[28]. Particularly, the methods proposed
in [27], [28] consider the case with non-linear dynamics.
However, the methods require knowing precisely when the
opinion of an agent has impacted that of another, which we
claim is unrealistic, given that what happens in people brains
is not visible and tracking their impact on an individual
would require testing the opinion of the neighborhood again,
which is an unnatural way of communicating.
In contrast, our work assumes only partial knowledge on
the social graph and that opinion updates have occurred at
unknown times due to unknown stimuli. All that we observe
are noisy versions of the agents opinions. This motivates us
to use steady state models as an approximation for what ties
the opinions we sample over time. However, to identify the
system we need, therefore, to prevent trivial consensus. Our
idea is to introduce a set of stubborn agents, i.e., agents who
are not swayed by other opinions [11], [12], [29], [30], into
the social network. The stubborn agents serve as ‘probes’
inserted on the social network that injects input to a social
system. Indeed, the stubborn agents change the terminal
behavior of the opinion dynamics and reveal the social
system in the form of an underdetermined linear system.
The contributions of this paper are two-fold. Firstly, we
formulate the SSI problem under the presence of stubborn
agents, and provide a set of conditions for identifiability.
Secondly, we consider the random opinion dynamics model
and propose an estimator for the (ensemble) mean of terminal
opinions. The mean square convergence of such estimator is
proven. We provide numerical results to verify our findings.
Notations: The Kronecker product is ⊗ and vec(·) as the
vectorization operator. Moreover, Diag : Rn → Rn×n and
diag : Rn×n → Rn are defined as the diagonal operators on
square matrices and vectors, respectively.
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II. SYSTEM MODEL
The social network has an associated graph G = (V,E)
where the vertexes are the set of agents V = [n] ,
{1, 2, ..., n} and social system we want to explore is the tuple
S = (E,W ) where W is the row-stochastic matrix of the
trust coefficients. We assume:
Assumption 2.1: The trust matrix W satisfies W ij > 0
and/or W ji > 0 if and only if ij ∈ E. W ii is the self-trust.
Our goal is to identify W by observing opinions whose
dynamics are consistent with S. Specifically, we assume
that the agents are shaping opinions over a certain issue
s ∈ N. Initially, each agent holds an opinion (belief) on
a discrete random variable Θs ∈ {θ1, . . . , θm}, i.e. the
p.m.f. xi(0; s) = (p(θ1|si,s), p(θ2|si,s), ..., p(θm−1|si,s))T ,
where p(θj |si,s) is the ith agent’s belief on the event Θs = θj
and si,s is the private information agent i has before its
interactions. Notice that p(θm|si,s) = 1 − 1Txi(0; s). The
beliefs are forged by the DeGroot’s model [20]:
xi(t+ 1; s) =
∑
j∈Ni
Wij(t)xj(t; s), (1)
whereNi is the set of neighbors of i and Wij(t) is the (i, j)th
element of the row stochastic matrix W (t). We assume that
W (t) is i.i.d. and drawn from a p.d.f. satisfying E{W (t)} =
W . The opinion dynamics can be described as
x(t+ 1; s) = W (t)x(t; s), (2)
where x(t; s) = (x1(t; s), ...,xn(t; s))T stacks the 1 × m
vectors to form an n × m matrix. Notice that the above
dynamics includes the randomized models in [31], [32] as
special cases. Moreover, what is active at a given time is
random and the trust matrix W is embedded in the opinion
dynamics (2). Our observations are actions/ratings that an
agent performs and that the social network is exposed to
(e.g., ‘liking’ a post on Facebook). We assume it is possible
to take a noisy snapshot of the opinions at time ti:
y(ti; s) = x(ti; s) + n(ti; s), (3)
where n(ti; s) contains i.i.d. noise samples with bounded
variance σ2. It is due to the fact that we do not have direct
access to the opinion or are using incomplete or outdated
information about it. Eq. (2) & (3) give a linear system
representation for the social system S with the state being
the opinions.
We define the social system identification (SSI) problem
as the task of inferring W from a set of measurements
y(Ts; s) , {y(ti; s)}ti∈Ts (and over a number of issues
s = 1, ...,K). The general SSI problem is challenging to
solve for several reasons. For example, we see that W is
hidden in the random model (2) and (3); also, from (2) it is
not even possible to retrieve W (t) from the samples since
m n, i.e., the linear equation is rank-deficient. We see that
additional prior knowledge must be incorporated to develop
a tractable SSI method.
There are a few prior studies on the SSI problem. Most
closely related to ours is the work in [26]–[28]. In particular,
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Fig. 1. Using stubborn agents as ‘probes’ on social systems
[26] considers the same model as ours. The authors assume
that the set Ts is consecutive, e.g., Ts = {ti, ti + 1, ..., tj}
and the trust matrix is static W (t) = W with known sparsity
pattern. In [27], [28], the authors consider a nonlinear dy-
namical system and applied compressed sensing to infer the
network topology from samples marked with time stamps.
The assumptions made in [26]–[28] may be restrictive for
social networks as the rate of interaction is unknown for
the latter, therefore the time stamp information cannot be
obtained accurately. Our idea is to introduce a set of stubborn
agents as probes; see Fig. 1. The developed SSI method
requires only partial knowledge on the topology E and is
applicable to the scenario with time-varying trust matrix.
III. STUBBORN AGENTS
In social networks, stubborn agents are those members
who place zero trust on their neighbors. In our framework
we assume there are ns < n stubborn agents in the social
network that we know of or control. We index them by Vs =
[ns]. The resulting trust matrix W (t) is:
W (t) =
(
Ins 0
B(t) D(t)
)
, (4)
and similar structure can be found in W . We assume:
Assumption 3.1: The support of B, EB = {ij : Bij >
0} = E(V, Vs), is known. Moreover, each agent in V has
non-zero trust on at least one agent in Vs.
The assumption asserts that each non-stubborn agents is
influenced by at least one stubborn agents. As the graph
G is connected, Assumption 3.1 implies that the principal
submatrix D satisfies ‖D‖2 < 1.
We demonstrate the specific structure in (4) gives rise to
a set of equations that allows a tractable solution to SSI. To
begin with, we assume that the opinion exchange is static,
i.e., W (t) = W for all t; this assumption will be relaxed
later in Section IV. Observe the following:
Observation 3.2: [11] Under the assumption that
W (t) = W . Consider (2) by setting t→∞, we get:
lim
t→∞x(t; s) = W
∞
x(0; s), (5)
where
W
∞
=
(
Ins 0
(I −D)−1B 0
)
. (6)
Consequently, non-stubborn agents’ opinions satisfy:
lim
t→∞(I −D)x[n]\[ns](t; s) = limt→∞Bx[ns](t; s)
= Bx[ns](0; s),
(7)
where we have defined x[ns](t; s) , (xi(t; s))i∈[ns]. In fact,
the right hand side of (7) can be replaced by Bx[ns](τ ; s)
for any τ ∈ N as the stubborn agents never change opinions.
The final opinions are driven by the initial opinions at the
stubborn agents. Importantly, Eq. (7) gives a set of linear
equations that characterizes the social system S. To this end,
we can define an estimator for limt→∞ x(t; s):
xˆ(Ts; s) = 1|Ts|
∑
ti∈Ts
y(ti; s), (8)
where the sampling set Ts is defined as
Ts = {ti : i ∈ [|Ts|], ti ≥ To, ∀ i}, (9)
where To  0. Notice that the time indices ti nor their orders
are not required in the computation of (8), i.e., we do not
need to know the exact time in which opinion updates have
occurred when sampling y(ti; s).
In the case of static exchange, it is easy to check that
the estimator (8) is consistent as |Ts| → ∞ and To → ∞;
see Section IV for a further discussion of its convergence
properties. Notice that unlike [26], we do not require the
sampling set Ts to be composed of consecutive indices.
Consider collecting the estimate (8) for K issues (i.e., s =
1, ...,K) into data matrices, we have the linear equation:
(I −D)Y = BZ +N , (10)
where
Y , (xˆ[n]\[ns](Ts; s))Ks=1 ∈ R(n−ns)×Km
Z , (xˆ[ns](Ts; s))Ks=1 ∈ Rns×Km
(11)
denote the data matrices for the opinions at the normal agents
and stubborn agents, respectively, and N is the additive noise
with variance σ2n that captures the estimation error from (8).
A. Identifying the Social System
Our next endeavor is to formulate the respective inverse
problem for SSI. In particular, our goal is to find the tuple
(B,D) that satisfies the system of equations:
(I −D)Y = BZ +N , (B D)1 = 1, B,D ≥ 0. (12)
We observe the following:
Lemma 3.3: Assume N = 0, there exists a tuple (B,D)
that satisfies (12). The tuple (B′,D′) also satisfies (12) with
B′ = ΛB, off(D′) = Λoff(D), (13a)
diag(D′) = 1−Λ(B1 + off(D)1), (13b)
where off(D) denotes the square matrix with only off-
diagonal elements in D and Λ is any non-negative diagonal
matrix such that diag(D′) ≥ 0.
Proof : The existence of (B,D) is ensured by picking
B = B,D = D. It is also obvious that the second equation
in (12) is satisfied by (B′,D′) for an arbitrary diagonal
matrix Λ. For the first equation in (12), we observe that
D′Y +B′Z = (Diag(diag(D′)) + off(D′))Y +B′Z
= Y −Λ((Diag(B1 + off(D)1)− off(D))Y −BZ)
= Y −Λ((Diag(1− diag(D))− off(D))Y −BZ)
= Y −Λ(Y −DY −BZ) = Y , (14)
where the third equality is due to B1 + off(D)1 = 1 −
diag(D). Q.E.D.
We define an equivalent relation ∼ as:
(B,D) ∼ (B′,D′) : ∃Λ ≥ 0 s.t. (13) holds. (15)
The relative trust weights, defined as Drij = Dij/(1−Dii)
and Brij = Bij/(1 − Dii), is preserved for all tuples be-
longing to the same equivalence class. Moreover, there exists
(B′,D′) with diag(D′) = 0 such that (B,D) ∼ (B′,D′)1.
Hence, we adopt a pragmatic approach to remedy the scaling
ambiguity by fixing diag(Dˆ) = 0.
The next ingredient is the fact that a social graph has
typically a sparse set of links between agents, i.e., D
is sparse. This motivates us to consider the following `0
minimization [33] problem:
min
Bˆ,Dˆ
‖off(Dˆ)‖0 (16a)
s.t. ‖(I − Dˆ)Y − BˆZ‖2F ≤ , (16b)(
Bˆ Dˆ
)
1 = 1, Dˆ ≥ 0, Bˆ ≥ 0, (16c)
Bˆij > 0, ∀ ij ∈ EB , Dˆii = 0, ∀ i, (16d)
where  > 0 is a regularization parameter that depends on
σn. Notice that the last constraint is due to Assumption 2.1
and the prior knowledge on EB .
Problem (16) is non-convex. However, Problem (16) can
be readily convexified by replacing the `0 norm in the
objective function by an `1 norm:
min
Bˆ,Dˆ
‖off(Dˆ)‖1 s.t. Eq. (16b) to (16d). (17)
The convexified problem can be solved using off-the-shelf
softwares, e.g., CVX [34].
Next, we study conditions under which (16) can identify
the social system S. Intuitively, we see that the identifiability
condition depends on the number of stubborn agents and
the sparsity of the trust matrix D. Importantly, in the case
with optimized placement of stubborn agents2, we have
the following condition, whose proof can be found in the
extended version of this paper [35].
Theorem 3.4: Let n > ns and the support of B ∈ Rn×ns
be constructed such that each row has d non-zero ele-
ments, selected randomly and independently. Define bmin =
minij∈supp(Br)Brij , bmax = maxij∈supp(Br)B
r
ij , ns = βn,
β′ = β − d/n and δ = 1− 1/(d− 1). If
d > max
{
4, 1 +
H(α) + β′H(α/β′)
α log(β′/α)
}
, (18)
bmin(2d− 3)− 1− 2bmax > 0, (19)
where H(x) is the binary entropy function, and ‖dri ‖0 ≤
αn/2 for all i, where wri is the ith row of D
r, then as
n→∞, solving (16) yields (B?,D?) = (Br,Dr).
1The corresponding Λ can be found as Λ = Diag(1/d1, . . . , 1/dn−ns )
with d = B1 + off(D)1.
2Such is possible in a controlled experiment setting, where the stubborn
agents can be controlled to influenced a sub-group of ordinary agents.
Using (18) it is possible to derive a lower bound β(d, α)
on β that depends on d, α and thus the number of stubborn
agents required. In fact, β(d, α) is a decreasing function in
d. We note from the proof of the theorem that there is a
tradeoff between d and the probability of successful recovery.
As such, the parameter d has to be chosen judiciously. In
addition, condition (19) requires the stubborn agents to be
sufficiently influential to the non-stubborn agents.
IV. RANDOMIZED MODELS WITH STUBBORN AGENTS
This section considers a general model of (2) with ran-
domized opinion exchange where W (t) is time varying and
i.i.d. with mean W . Under this setting, the limit equation
(7) only holds in expectation, i.e.,
lim
t→∞(I −D)E{x[n]\[ns](t; s)|x(0; s)}
= lim
t→∞BE{x[ns](t; s)|x(0; s)}.
(20)
Notice that the expectation is taken over the ensemble of
sample paths of {W (t)}t. In practice, computing the expec-
tation requires the social network to ‘repeat’ the discussion
on the same issue. Obtaining limt→∞ E{x(t; s)|x(0; s)} can
be difficult in terms of implementation.
Interestingly, it has been observed that in a randomized
opinion exchange model, the introduction of stubborn agents
leads to a behavior known as opinion fluctuation [29], [30].
Observation 4.1: If ns ≥ 2 and the opinion exchange
model is random, then x(t+ 1; s) 6= x(t; s) almost surely.
Our goal is to derive an estimator for
limt→∞ E{x(t; s)|x(0; s)} that relies on the samples
from a single issue s only. From Observation 4.1, a natural
design is to consider an estimator that averages over the
temporal samples, i.e., Eq. (8). We have [36]:
Theorem 4.2: Consider the estimator in (8)
with the sampling set Ts. Denote x(∞; s) ,
limt→∞ E{x(t; s)|x(0; s)} = W∞x(0; s) and assume
that ‖D‖2 = E{‖D(t)‖2}. If To →∞, then
1) the estimator (8) is unbiased:
E{xˆ(Ts; s)|x(0; s)} = x(∞; s). (21)
2) the estimator (8) is consistent:
lim
|Ts|→∞
E{‖xˆ(Ts; s)−x(∞; s)‖2F |x(0; s)} = 0. (22)
It follows that the method in Section III-A can be applied.
Note that the convergence of (8) is related to the ergodicity
of the random process (2). For instance, [4] has studied the
convergence of the ergodic mean of an opinion exchange
model with external input. To our knowledge, our result is the
first for randomized opinion exchange with stubborn agents.
A. Proof of Theorem 4.2
We first prove that the estimator is unbiased. Consider the
following chain:
E{xˆ(Ts; s)|x(0; s)} = 1|Ts|
∑
ti∈Ts
E{y(ti; s)|x(0; s)}
=
1
|Ts|
∑
ti∈Ts
W
ti
x(0; s) = W
∞
x(0; s),
(23)
where we have used the fact that To → ∞ and ti ≥ To for
all ti in the last equality.
Next, we prove that the estimator is asymptotically con-
sistent, i.e., (22). Without loss of generality, we let t1 <
t2 < . . . < t|Ts| as the sampling instances. The following
shorthand notation will be useful:
Φ(s, t) ,W (t)W (t− 1) . . .W (s+ 1)W (s), (24)
where t ≥ s and Φ(s, t) is a random matrix. Our proof
involves the following lemma:
Lemma 4.3: When |t − s| → ∞, the random matrix
Φ(s, t) converges almost surely to the following:
lim
|t−s|→∞
Φ(s, t) =
(
I 0
B(s, t) 0
)
, (25)
where B(s, t) =
∑t
q=s(D(t) . . .D(q))B(q) is bounded
almost surely.
The proof is in Appendix A. We consider the following:
E{‖xˆ(Ts; s)− x(∞; s)‖2F |x(0; s)} =
= E
{∥∥∥ 1|Ts| ∑
ti∈Ts
(
y(ti; s)− x(∞; s)
)∥∥∥2
F
|x(0; s)
}
.
(26)
Recall that y(ti; s) = x(ti; s) + n(ti; s) and the noise
term n(ti; s) is independent of W (t) for all t. The above
expression reduces into:
E
{∥∥∥ 1|Ts|∑ti∈Ts (x(ti; s)− x(∞; s))∥∥∥2F |x(0; s)}
+E
{∥∥∥ 1|Ts|∑ti∈Ts n(ti; s)∥∥∥2F}. (27)
It is easy to check that the latter term vanishes when |Ts| →
∞. We thus focus on the former term.
E
{∥∥∥ 1|Ts| ∑
ti∈Ts
(
x(ti; s)− x(∞; s)
)∥∥∥2
F
|x(0; s)
}
=
1
|Ts|2E
{∥∥∥ ∑
ti∈Ts
(
Φ(0, ti)−W∞
)
x(0; s)
∥∥∥2
F
}
=
1
|Ts|2E
{
Tr
(
Ξx(0; s)x(0; s)T
)}
,
(28)
where
Ξ =
∑
tj∈Ts
(
Φ(0, tj)−W∞
)T ∑
ti∈Ts
(
Φ(0, ti)−W∞
)
. (29)
Expanding the above product yields two groups of terms
— when ti = tj and when ti 6= tj . When ti = tj , using
To →∞ and Lemma 4.3, it is straightforward to show that:
‖E{(Φ(0, ti)−W∞)T (Φ(0, ti)−W∞)}‖ ≤ C, (30)
for some constant C <∞. As a matter of fact, we observe
that the above term will not vanish at all. This is due
to Observation 4.1, the random matrix Φ(0, ti) does not
converge in mean square sense.
For the latter case, we assume tj > ti. We have(
Φ(0, tj)−W∞
)T (
Φ(0, ti)−W∞
)
=
(
Φ(ti + 1, tj)Φ(0, ti)−W∞
)T (
Φ(0, ti)−W∞
)
.
(31)
Taking expectation of the above term gives:
E
{(
Φ(0, ti)−W∞
)T
W
tj−ti(
Φ(0, ti)−W∞
)}
,
(32)
where we have used the fact that Φ(ti + 1, tj) is indepen-
dent of the other random variables in the expression and
W
∞
W
`
= W
∞
for any ` ≥ 0. Now, notice that
W
tj−ti
= W
∞
+O(λtj−ti), (33)
for some 0 < λ , λmax(D) < 1. This is due to the fact
that D is sub-stochastic.
As To → ∞ and by invoking Lemma 4.3, the matrix
(Φ(0, ti)−W∞) has almost surely only non-empty entries
in the lower left block. Through carrying out the block matrix
multiplications and using the boundedless of Φ(0, ti), it can
be verified that∥∥E{(Φ(0, tj)−W∞)T (Φ(0, ti)−W∞)}∥∥ ≤ O(λtj−ti).
(34)
Combining these results, we can show
E
{
Tr
(
Ξx(0; s)x(0; s)T
)}
|Ts|2 ≤
C ′
|Ts|
( |Ts|−1∑
i=0
λmink |tk+i−tk|
)
,
(35)
for some C ′ < ∞. Notice that mink |tk+i − tk| ≥ i and
the terms inside the bracket can be upper bounded by the
geometric series
∑|Ts|−1
i=0 λ
i < ∞. Consequently, the mean
square error goes to zero as |Ts| → ∞. The estimator (8)
converges in the mean square sense and is thus consistent.
Remark 4.4: From (35), we observe that the upper bound
on mean square error can be minimized by maximizing
mini,j,i 6=j |ti−tj |. When the samples y(Ts; s) are taken from
a finite interval [Tmax] \ [To], Tmax <∞ and |Ts| <∞, the
best estimate can be obtained by using sampling instances
that are drawn uniformly from [Tmax] \ [To].
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
This section provides numerical results for the perfor-
mance of SSI. Two simple scenarios on the static and
randomized model are considered.
The social graph G = (V,E) is generated as an Erdos-
Renyi graph with connectivity pe = 0.15. We fix the number
of normal agents at n−ns = 50. We assume m = 1 and the
number of issues to be discussed is K = 100. For the static
model, the trust matrix W is first generated with uniformly
distributed entries, which are then normalized to satisfy row-
stochasticity as well as the sparsity pattern according to E;
cf. Assumption 2.1. For the randomized model, we have
adopted the randomized broadcast gossip exchange model in
[32]. In particular, at each time, a random agent wakes up and
broadcast his/her opinion to the neighbors. The neighbors
then mix the opinion with the weight γ = 1/2; see [32].
In light of Lemma 3.3, we compare the relative trust that
an agent has on his/her neighbors. In particular, we evaluate
the error in estimating the relative trust matrix D
r
,B
r
as
D
r
ij = Dij/(1 − Dii), B
r
ij = Bij/(1 − Dii) and D
′
ii = 0
for all i. The normalized mean square error (MSE) for D is∑
i,j(Dˆij −D
r
ij)
2/(
∑
i,j(D
r
ij)
2) (and similarly for B).
Fig. 2. Average performance of social system identification under the static
model: (Left) the relative MSE in estimatingDr andBr (Right) the support
recovery error — |{ij : Dij 6= 0, Dˆij = 0, or, Dij = 0, Dˆij 6= 0}|.
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Fig. 3. Identifying a social system under the randomized gossip exchange
model: (Left) the normalized trust matrix Dr of the actual social sys-
tem. (Right) the normalized estimated trust matrix Dˆr . The darkness of
the dot represents the amount of trust between a pair of agents.
We first evaluate the SSI performance under the static
model with Monte-Carlo simulation. For each ns, we av-
erage over 100 instances of social graphs to evaluate the
normalized MSE. The noise σ2 is assumed to be zero. As
such, we can set To = 104 and |Ts| = 1 for the estimator
(8). We compare the normalized MSE in terms of the relative
trust matrices, against the number of stubborn agents ns. The
simulation results are shown in Fig. 2. As seen, the system
identification performance gradually improves as ns grows.
Moreover, the performance is significantly better when the
subgraph between stubborn and non-stubborn agents is con-
structed as a random regular bipartite graph, cf. Theorem 3.4.
Notice that the theorem’s condition requires ns ≥ 38.
The next simulation example considers the case with
random opinion exchanges. We focus on one instance of the
social graph generated and we set the number of stubborn
agents to ns = 30. We conduct the test when ΩB is generated
as a random non-regular bipartite graph of connectivity
ps = 0.15. For the estimator proposed in Section IV, we set
To = 10
3 and |Ts| = 3×103, where sampling instances ti in
Ts is uniformly drawn from {103 + 1, . . . , 105}. The noise
variance is σ2 = 10−4 and we set  =
√
K × 1.65 × 10−2
in (16). The estimated social system is depicted in Fig. 3.
Notice that in this case, the normalized MSE is evaluated as
7.01× 10−2.
We observe that the identified social system is close to the
actual social system. However, some links with weak trusts
can also be found in the estimate Dˆr. This is possibly an
artefact from the estimation of x(∞; s) using (8).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have defined the SSI problem for identifying both the
social graph and mutual trusts between individuals in social
networks. The system identification is achieved via the in-
clusions of stubborn agents and conditions for identifiability
are proven. We have proposed a consistent estimator for the
ensemble mean opinions in randomized gossip model.
This work paves a key stone towards developing a Social
Radar that estimates the relative influence between individu-
als. Future directions will include developing an efficient and
parallelizable solution method for solving (17) and tightening
the necessary condition for identifiability.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 4.3
We first establish the almost sure convergence of
D(t)D(t− 1) . . .D(s) to 0. Define
β(s, t) , ‖D(t)D(t− 1) . . .D(s)‖2, (36)
and observe the following chain
E{β(s, t)|β(s, t− 1), ..., β(s, s)}
≤ E{‖D(t)‖2‖D(t− 1) . . .D(s)‖2|β(s, t− 1)}
= E{‖D(t)‖2}β(s, t− 1) ≤ cβ(s, t− 1),
(37)
where c = ‖D‖2 < 1 due to Assumption 3.1. The almost
sure convergence of β(s, t) follows from [37, Lemma 7].
Now, expanding the multiplication (24) yields:
Φ(s, t) =
(
I 0
B(s, t) D(t) . . .D(s)
)
. (38)
The desired result is achieved by observing D(t) . . .D(s)→
0 and B(s, t) is bounded almost surely.
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